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Q: Will the Supreme Court
intervention in Florida fail
the test of time?
Yes: The miscarriage

By

IRA

of iustice to minority
citizens whose votes
were discarded unfairly was ignored.
In 1857 the U.S. Supreme Court effectively upheld the constitutionality of slavery by striking down as unconstitutional a federallaw that prohibited slavery in U.S. territories outside the South.
Far worse than the decision in Dred Scott v. Sanford case itself
was the language of the opinion supporting it. ChiefJustice Roger
B. Taney wrote that blacks were "subordinate and inferior beings"
and that they had "no rights which the white man was bound to
respect."
There probably has never been a Supreme Court decision more
crushing to the hopes and aspirations of equal-rights advocates
than Dred Scott. But Frederick Douglass, the leading black abolitionist of the time, did not react with despondence or despair.
He said: "The Supreme Court is not the only power in this world.
We, the abolitionists and colored people, should meet this decision, unlooked for and monstrous as it appears, in a cheerful spirit. This very attempt to blot out forever the hopes of an enslaved
people may be one necessary link in the chain of events preparatory to the complete overthrow of the whole slave system."
It is not necessary to equate the Supreme Court's decision on
Dec. 12 with the Dred Scott decision- indeed, it would be
obscene to do so. We should take Douglass' reaction as a guide
for our own. Our nation must now rededicate itself to assuring the
equal right to vote. In this, the Supreme Court's Dec. 12 decision
contains a number of opportunities that the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) will begin to address through litigation in
the coming weeks.
The equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment was written in the first instance to address local and state-based racial
inequalities. In George W Bush and Richard Cheney v. AI Gore,
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et al., the U.S. Supreme Court discovered a 14th Amendment equal-protection violation in the differential ways
that disputed ballots were being counted in Florida. But these disputed ballots
and the methods used to evaluate them
ofVisions of Liberty:
only arose because ofthe differential use
The Bill of Rights for
All Americans.
of punch-card machines in some counties but not in others. In terms of practical impact, these and other inequalities
almost certainly affected a greater number of votes than any inconsistencies that might have arisen from
the manual recount that was under way in Florida and did so, moreover, in a way that clearly discriminated against racial minorities.
But it also provides an opportunity for those who truly are dedicated to the principles of equal protection to challenge prospectively the differential use of punch-card machines in Florida and
also across the country. If the U.S. Supreme Court claims to be
sensitive to equal-protection problems in the area of voting, the
ACLU is ready to accommodate it.
Thus, if there were an equal-protection problem in Florida, it
arose out of the racially disparate use or different voting machines,
and was both more serious and prior to the equal-protection problem arising out of the evaluation and counting ofdisputed ballots.
Indeed, the evaluation and counting ofdisputed ballots was a remedy for the prior equal-protection problem arising out of the different machines. For the Supreme Court to pretend, as it did, that
an equal-protection problem arose initially at the stage of evaluation and counting disputed ballots, while it ignored the prior equalprotection problem, exposes the intellectual dishonesty of the
court's approach.
According to a Dec. 1 report in the New York Times, counties
that used punch-card machines turned out ballots that showed no
vote for president at a far higher rate than counties that used optical-scanner machines. In 30 Florida counties that used optical scanners, for example, only three-tenths of 1 percent ofthe ballots were
recorded as having no presidential vote. But in 15 counties that
used punch-card machines, 1.86 percent registered no presidential vote - more than six times the rate of optical scanners.
(continued on page 42)
Glasser is the executive
director ofthe American Civil Liberties
Union based in New
York and is the author
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No: The maiority
decision vindicated the rule of law
and upheld the
U.S. Constitution.
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On Dec. 12 the U.S. Supreme Court put an end to the seemingly endless Florida "reGounts" that followed the Nov. 7 presidential election. Critics have claimed that the court overstepped its
authority and infringed "states' rights"- here, the "right'' of the
Florida Supreme Court to order a 64-county recount without
articulating any objective standards governing what did and did
not constitute a "vote." Some even have questioned the legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court's action, claiming that the strong
disagreement among the justices somehow undermines the
authority of the decision. These criticisms, however, miss the
mark. The court's intervention vindicated the rule of law, preserved the supremacy of the U.S. Constitution and should
enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
The Florida recounts appeared "legal" in the ordinary sense
of that word. Duly elected canvassing boards initiated the counts,
pursuant to their statutory authority. Courts intervened occasionally, ordering boards to change their standards, extending
deadlines and compelling further recounts. Yet, despite all
appearances of a "legal" process, these recounts offended the rule
of law. At a minimum, the rule of law requires the state to act
according to the general rules that were in effect before the dispute at hand. These procedural requirements of prospectivity and
generality ensure that law is made behind a veil of ignorance,
without reference to any particular controversy, so that law reflects
the lawmaker's unbiased judgment about the "best" rule. A decision that does not comport with these requirements is not "legal"
in any meaningful sense, but is instead arbitrary human action,
with no claim to legitimacy or respect.
The Florida recounts contravened each of the procedural
requirements described above. A court ordered Palm Beach
County to count "dimpled" chads as votes, in violation of the
county's rule, promulgated in 1990, which expressly forbade the
counting of dimples. While Broward County had no written policy, it never had counted dimples in the past. When it started its
recount, Broward announced that it would follow prior practice
and only count "two-corner" chads. A judge soon intervened,
however, ordering the board to count some dimples as votes.
Though ostensibly "legal," both of these orders changed the rules
after the election and knowingly advantaged one candidate. Rule
by judges replaced the "rule of law."
Florida did not stop there, however. It also violated the principle of generality- the requirement that like cases be treated
alike. Palm Beach County refused to count ballots with isolated dimples as votes. Midway through its recount, however,
Broward County relaxed its standard even further, counting such
dimples as votes, even where the voter had punched the chad for
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a candidate for every other office on the ballot. The Miami-Dade County canvassing
board could not agree on a standard; each
board member applied his own. Thus, Florida treated different voters differently, based
solely on their county of residence, and no
official explained why. It just so happened,
however, that the county (Broward) that had
produced the most votes for Al Gore on Nov.
7 was applying the standard most likely to
turn up even more.
Viewed in their entirety, then, the Florida recount proceedings were not legal in any sense, but were instead an exemplar
oflawless and arbitrary state action. Unfortunately, the U.S. Constitution contains no general prohibition on retroactive lawmaking. (The ex post facto clause, for instance, only applies to
criminal punishments.) The U.S. Constitution does, however, contain a sort of generality requirement in the form of the equal-protection clause of the 14th Amendment. For nearly four decades,
the Supreme Court repeatedly has held that voting is a "fundamental" right and that practices granting some votes more
weight than others violate the equal-protection guarantee, unless
a compelling interest justifies such differential treatment. This
"one person, one vote" line of cases, which no justice questions,
applies regardless of whether the practice at issue discriminates
based on race.
On Nov. 22, George W Bush petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court to enforce the equal-protection guarantee by requiring
Florida to adopt uniform standards governing the ongoing
recounts. The court refused, thus giving the Florida Supreme
Court a chance to clean up the constitutional mess that was evolving under its supervision. Inexplicably, the Florida high court proceeded to make things worse. In its Dec. 8 order reversing Judge
N. Sanders Sauls, four Florida Supreme Court justices ordered
the arbitrary results of the recounts in Palm Beach, Miami-Dade,
and Broward counties included in the final certification. Moreover, the court ordered a count of the ''undervotes" in the 64 Florida counties that had not completed recounts. In so doing, the court
rejected Bush's claim that the equal-protection clause required
a uniform standard, vaguely admonishing 64 counties to determine the "clear intent of the voter." This, of course, was the same
"standard" purportedly followed by Palm Beach, Miami-Dade
and Broward counties.
Within hours of this decision, Bush's lawyers implored Leon
County Circuit Judge Terry Lewis, who was overseeing the
recounts, to set a uniform standard. Lewis refused, leaving each
county free to recount the undervotes however it saw fit. Standards began to multiply, as Hillsborough County- which had
narrowly gone for Bush - announced that it actually would
adhere to its customary approach and not count dimples. Four
different counties had produced four different standards. The
process was getting more, not less, arbitrary.
It was at this point that the U.S. Supreme Court finally
stepped in, ordering a halt to the lawless spectacle unfolding on
Dec. 9. Although only five justices voted for the initial stay, seven
ultimately agreed with Bush that the recount ordered by the Flori-
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GLASSER: continued from page 40

Overall, according to the Times, voters using the now infamous
Votomatic machines showed no vote for president at a rate five
times higher than voters using optical scanners. It defies reason
to suggest that voters in counties using punch-card systems willfully decided not to vote for president at a rate five to six times
higher than citizens in counties using optical scanners.
Moreover, these disparities had a clear racial sub text. According to the Times, 64 percent ofFlorida's black voters live in counties that used punch-card systems, which are cheaper, while 56
percent of whites do. Sixty-three percent of Gore's vote, which
included heavy majorities among black voters, were counted on punch-card machines
while only 55 percent of Bush's vote was.
This pattern was reversed in votes tallied by
optical scanners.
There are other issues besides those raised
by the racially disparate rejection of ballots
by different machines. In Florida, according
to the Times, some counties, mostly heavily
white, had computers to relieve the problem
of voters whose valid registration information
was not available at the precinct, while other
counties, mostly black, did not. Since Florida does not allow for provisional voting in
such cases, black voters disproportionately were rejected, even
though eligible.
In addition, disproportionate numbers of minority voters were
purged from the voter rolls prior to the election based on alleged
felony records that were never verified. A data-service firm hired
by the Republican Party apparently provided a list of8,000 "possible felons," which local election officials had no time to investigate and did not investigate. But they did disqualify the 8,000,
who were heavily minority.
Aside from inaccurate felony records, there is the issue offelony
disenfranchisement itself. Throughout the nation, 13 percent of
all African-American men are barred from voting as the result of
prior felonies. In the South, the percentage is about 30 percent. In

Florida, it was 31.2 percent -more than 200,000 citizens. The
majority of these felonies were nonviolent offenses, many, if not
most, for nonviolent drug offenses.
The explosion of drug-war arrests and convictions in recent
years has led to an explosion of felony disenfranchisement. And
the racial profiling inherent in how the drug war is enforced has
been reflected in a racial disproportion in felony disenfranchisement. According to the federal government's own statistics,
approximately 13 percent of all monthly drug users are black
(about their proportion in the population), while 35 percent of
arrests for nonviolent drug offenders are
black, as are 55 percent of convictions
and 74 percent of prisoners. These disproportions are indefensible and lead to
similar disproportions in felony disenfranchisement.
Moreover, prisoners and former felons
no longer under the jurisdiction of the
criminal-justice system are counted for the
purposes of determining the number of a
state's congressional representation and
Electoral College votes, even though they
are not allowed to vote. This, of course, is
like the three-fifths compromise that
counted slaves for the purposes ofdetermining the number of representatives and Electoral College votes while in other respects
treating them like chattel and denying them all rights, including
the right to vote.
Looking forward, our country must identify these problems systematically to see where and to what extent they and other similar problems exist and fashion a comprehensive plan to remedy
them. The ACLU is fully prepared to propel these remedies
through legal challenges, legislation and public campaigns to
ensure that the principle of equal protection in voting so recently
embraced by the conservative majority of the court does, indeed,
apply to all people, regardless of race, color or previous condition
of servitude.
•
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da Supreme Court offended the equal-protection clause. In an
opinion joined by Justice Stephen Breyer, Justice David Souter
put it best: "I can conceive of no legitimate state interest served
by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental rights. The differences appear wholly arbitrary." The
two dissenters on this point were entirely unpersuasive. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg reminded us that it was "an imperfect
world" and asserted that an arbitrary, standardless recount was
better than none. Justice John Paul Stevens claimed that any constitutional shortcomings could be eliminated by trusting - but
not requiring - Judge Lewis to rule on individual written objections to each decision to count or not to count a particular bal-
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lot. Whether and how a judge who had just refused to set uniform standards would voluntarily reverse course and ensure uniformity in this ex post facto fashion was anybody's guess.
Despite their agreement that the standardless statewide
recount contravened the equal protection clause, Breyer and
Souter split with the majority over the question of remedy. The
majority took at face value the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion that the Florida Legislature intended any contest to end
on Dec. 12. Further recounts, then, would thwart the legislative will and thus violate Article II of the Constitution. Souter
and Breyer, in contrast, would have given the Florida Supreme
Court the opportunity to order recounts of all undervotes,
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including those in Broward and Palm Beach counties, under a
uniform standard. Neither of these justices explained how
these recounts could be consistent with the Florida Supreme
Court's prior pronouncements about the Dec. 12 deadline and,
by extension, Article II.
The claim that the majority decision somehow interfered
with "states' rights" would be a strong one if it had been made
in 1858, when the federal government was without authority
to ensure equality between its citizens. Important events including the Civil War and the adoption
of the 14th Amendment- have intervened since then, radically altering the
federal-state balance. By its very nature,
the equal-protection clause requires the
U.S. Supreme Court to second-guess state
actions - including judicial decisions
- that treat citizens differently for arbitrary reasons. The whole point of the
"one person, one vote" decisions is that
states have no right to treat the votes of one
person differently from the votes of
another. Taken to its logical (and horrifYing) conclusion, a preference for states'
rights over equal protection would empower states to reinstitute segregation.
Certainly, the majority would have preferred unanimous
agreement with its decision. Legitimacy, however, is not anumbers game. The authority of judges and the concomitant power
of judicial review rests upon the law, in this case the supreme
law contained in the U.S. Constitution. A judicial opinion that
flouts this law does not become legitimate because it is unanimous or nearly so. (The doctrine of "separate but equal"
announced in Plessy v. Ferguson did not derive one iota oflegitimacy from the 7-1 vote that embraced it.) Conversely, an opinion that is correct does not become suspect because four dissenting justices get things wrong. West Coast Hotels v. Parrish,
which rejected constitutional attacks on the minimum wage, was
decided 5-4, with the dissenters declaring an end to constitutional

government. In the end, a court's legitimacy depends upon its
ability to articulate a convincing legal rationale for its decision.
The five justices who joined the majority opinion in Bush v. Gore
did just that, and they apparently believed that their oath required
them to do their constitutional duty as they saw it, instead ofbrokering a political compromise designed to gain additional votes.
In the long run, such fidelity to constitutional principle will
enhance the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
To be sure, the rationale offered by the majority already has
come under attack from academics and
others who claim that the court's five
more conservative justices put an end to
lawless recounts for political reasons.
This drumbeat of criticism may lead nonexperts to question the correctness, and
thus the legitimacy, of the result. But the
general public should understand that
individuals who comment on tl1e work of
the Supreme Court are not always neutral,
dispassionate experts. Most members of
the legal professoriat, for instance, are far
left or left of center: few voted for George
W Bush, and most share Gore's admiration for an evolving Constitution.
Many of these scholars hoped that Gore as president would
appoint judges who would use the Constitution to advance their
political agendas by voiding the death penalty, expanding the
right to abortion and ignoring constitutional limits on congressional power. (So much for legitimacy and states' rights!) The
true measure of the majority's decision will not be found in the
opinion of partisan professors.
The legitimacy of governmental action depends upon adherence to the rule of law, and the Florida recounts did not pass
this test. By voiding the arbitrary and standardless recounts
ordered by the Florida Supreme Court, the U.S . Supreme
Court's majority vindicated the rule of law and discharged its
obligation to the Constitution as it understood it. We should have
•
expected no less.

The Florida recount
proceedingslVere
not legal, but
lVere instead an
examplar of lalVIess
and arbitrary
state action.
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